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CAUGHT IN THE ACT BUT NOT
PUNISHED: ON ELITE RULE OF LAW
AND DETERRENCE
Francesca R. Jensenius and Abby K. Wood
Most literature on criminal deterrence in law, economics, and criminology assumes that people
who are caught for a crime will be punished. The literature focuses on how the size of sanctions
and probability of being caught affect criminal behavior. However, in many countries entire
groups of people are “above the law” in the sense that they are able to evade punishment even if
caught violating the law. In this paper we argue that both the perceived probability of being
punished if caught and the cultural acceptance of elites evading punishment are important parts
of theorizing about deterrence, particularly about corruption among political elites. Looking at
data on parking violations among diplomats in New York City 1997–2002, we explore how
diplomats from different rule-of-law cultures respond to sudden legal immunity. The empirical
observations provide clear evidence of both the stickiness and the gradual weakening of cultural
constraints.

Keywords: Corruption, rule of law, criminal
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I. INTRODUCTION
Most literature on deterring criminal behavior assumes that
people who are caught for a crime will be punished. In the classic
deterrence model, deterrence depends on the expected benefit of the
criminal act, weighed against the probability of being caught, and the
size of the sanction if caught. Yet, in many parts of the world, there
are entire groups of people who are not really subject to the rule of
law, as they are able to evade punishment even if caught breaking the
law. Who these groups are, and how large they are, varies from
country to country. De facto immunity from punishment can run with
class status, kinship, wealth, ethnicity, or status as a political elite. For
people who are above the law, no increase in the size of the formal
sanction for committing a crime or corrupt act, and no increase in
detection efforts by the government, will alter their propensity to
engage in criminal or corrupt behavior, because the probability of
being punished if caught is too low for legal enforcement to affect
their behavior.
An important question is how elites respond to de facto
immunity and to changes in the probability of being punished if caught
for a criminal act. Such changes may occur more often than we might
think: Civil wars end and relative power shifts between groups;
constitutional amendments are passed, resulting in less-favored
groups being given formal equality; the presidency changes hands and
with it one family rises while another falls.
In this paper, we explore data from another such change,
which is more easily accessible. We use data from a paper by
Raymond Fisman and Edward Miguel to examine the propensity of
diplomats from across the world to accumulate unpaid parking
tickets in New York City, where they for several years enjoyed
diplomatic immunity.1 Dividing diplomats’ countries into four ruleof-law cultures, we show that there is great variation in the reactions
of diplomats from different cultures. Elites hailing from cultures
where it is common to abuse elite privileges were quick to embrace
the opportunity to do so. Diplomats from countries in which elites
Raymond Fisman & Edward Miguel, Corruption, Norms, and Legal
Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets, 115 J. POL. ECON. 1020 (2007).
1
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tend to be more accountable were more law-abiding. And
interestingly, those diplomats from strong rule-of-law cultures who
started violating in higher numbers over time, did so occasionally
rather than constantly. These findings suggest that both the perceived
probability of being punished if caught and the cultural acceptance of
elites evading punishment are important parts of theorizing about
deterrence, particularly about corruption among political elites.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II explains a concept
implicit in general deterrence theory: the perceived probability of
being punished if caught for a crime, and also discusses the
importance of ethics and culture in constraining behavior. Here we
also describe the data from New York that we use to explore how
political elites from different rule-of-law cultures respond to a zeroenforcement legal environment. In section III, we explain the
typology that divides countries into four categories of corruption
types that we use in our analysis. Section IV presents diplomats’
responses, by group, to entering a zero-enforcement environment.
Section V concludes.
II. RULE OF LAW AND ELITE DETERRENCE
Scholars of law, economics, sociology, and public policy have
built an extensive literature exploring criminal deterrence in various
contexts.2 The basic model in the literature theorizes that general
deterrence from criminal behavior is a function of the probability of
detection, the size of the sanction, and the benefit that the would-be
violator stands to gain if not detected. Scholars have focused
especially on how changes in the perceived or actual probability that a
See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS,
DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973); Gary S. Becker,
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968); Gary S.
Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers,
3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974); Daniel S. Nagin & Greg Pogarsky, Integrating Celebrity,
Impulsivity, and Extralegal Sanction Threats into a Model of General Deterrence: Theory and
Evidence, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 865 (2001); Mitchell A. Polinsky & Steven Shavell,
Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement, 81 J. PUB. ECON. 1 (2001); Aaron Chalfin &
Justin McCrary, Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the Literature (May 9, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
2
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crime is detected and changes in the size of the formal or informal
sanction affect levels of deterrence. Yet, the probability of being
punished if caught for a criminal act is also a key determinant of how
people behave, and therefore of the efficiency of deterrence. In a
review of deterrence literature, Steven N. Durlauf and Daniel S.
Nagin conclude that there is limited evidence of an effect of the size
of a sanction in deterring criminal acts, but considerable evidence
that the certainty of a sanction affects behavior.3 They point out that
while there is an extensive literature about how this certainty is
affected by the probability of detection, little is written about the
probability of being prosecuted and sentenced, that is: the probability
of being punished if caught.
It is not an unreasonable simplification to assume that people
are sanctioned when they are caught for a crime when studying nonelites, but it is a heroic assumption to make about elites. Across the
world there is great variation in elite’s propensity of being sentenced
if caught for a criminal act. In some cases, the law actually mandates
prosecution with a probability of zero. For example, sitting heads of
state enjoy de jure immunity from prosecution under international law,
and the U.S. Department of Justice does not consider a sitting U.S.
President to be “amenable to prosecution.”4 Nevertheless, de jure
immunity is a relatively rare phenomenon. Most people in the world
who are immune from punishment do not enjoy de jure immunity –
the law does not protect them. Rather, they enjoy de facto immunity.
De facto immunity covers a broader set of people across the world and
is based on suspects being able to use bribes, friendships, threats,
coercion, or other means of pressure in order to avoid, minimize,
delay, or completely avoid the sanction.5

Steven N. Durlauf & Daniel S. Nagin, Overview of “Imprisonment and
Crime: Can Both Be Reduced?” 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 9 (2011).
4
Randolph D. Moss, A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and
Criminal
Prosecution,
24
O P.
O.L.C.
222
(2000),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2000/10/31/op-olcv024-p0222_0.pdf.
5
See Brian J. Fried, Paul Lagunes & Atheendar Venkataramani,
Corruption and Inequality at the Crossroad: A Multimethod Study of Bribery and
Discrimination in Latin America, 45 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 76 (2010); Michael
Johnston, Corruption, Inequality, and Change, in CORRUPTION, DEVELOPMENT AND
INEQUALITY: SOFT TOUCH OR HARD GRAFT 13 (Peter M. Ward ed., 1989); Brian
3
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The extent to which elites are able to avoid punishment when
caught for criminal acts is closely related to corruption. Polinsky and
Shavell demonstrate the logic of how corruption undermines
deterrence by making it possible to bribe or extort one’s way out of
punishment.6 Missing from the discussion is how the ability to evade
punishment differs based on individual characteristics: we know that
elites are much more likely to be able to evade punishment than nonelites. We also know that there is great cultural variation in the
acceptance of some people being above the law. In some cultural
contexts, elites can literally get away with murder.
While many countries could provide examples of elites
enjoying a high degree of de facto immunity, we offer examples from
India and Brazil to build intuition. In India’s 2014 elections for the
543 seats in the Lok Sabha (lower house of parliament), more than
one third of the candidates faced criminal charges – and more than
60% of those faced especially serious charges.7 Moreover, Indian
elites are notorious for using their networks and bribes to make sure
their criminal cases join the judicial backlog, which is now 30 million
cases long.8 In Brazil, experimental evidence suggests that, when
compared to lower-class drivers, upper-class drivers are both less
likely to be stopped when committing a traffic violation and more
likely to receive only a warning during traffic stops that do occur.9
There is great variation in which groups of elites are above
the law both between countries and within countries – people with a
J. Fried, Paul Lagunes & Atheendar Venkataramani, Corruption and Inequality at the
Crossroad: A Multimethod Study of Bribery and Discrimination in Latin America, 45 LATIN
AM. RES. REV. 76 (2010); Joel S. Hellman & Daniel Kaufmann, The Inequality of
Influence (Dec. 2002) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
6
Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 2.
7
Lok Sabha Elections 2014 Analysis of Criminal Background, Financial,
Education, Gender and other details of Winners, report by the Association for
Democratic Reform, May 18, 2014, http://www.adrindia.org/research-andreport/election-watch/lok-sabha/2014/lok-sabha-2014-winners-analysis-criminaland-finan.
8
Ram Mashru, Justice Delayed is Justice Denied: India’s 30 Million Case
Judicial
Backlog,
THE
DIPLOMAT,
Dec.
25,
2013,
http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/justice-delayed-is-justice-denied-indias-30million-case-judicial-backlog/.
9
Fried, Lagunes & Venkataramani, supra note 5.
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high socioeconomic status, from historically advantaged ethnic
groups, families or castes, or those who hold government positions,
could all enjoy de facto immunity. Our main point is that for these
elites, neither the size of the formal sanction for committing a crime
nor the detection efforts by the government are the main
determinants of whether they choose to commit a crime.
1. Culture, Institutions, and Ethics
Not all those who have an opportunity to go unpunished will
take advantage of their impunity. Both personal ethics and grouplevel culture could serve as constraints. For example, while it is well
known that some civil servants and politicians in India take kickbacks, speed money, and bribes, many officials are also proud to say
that they never do so.10
Whereas the institutional framework we examine in the
deterrence literature is usually quite clear, the cultural and ethical
mechanisms are not only less tidy, but also less explored in political
science and economics. The line between culture and institutions is
also quite fuzzy. Many aspects of culture can be thought of as a series
of informal institutional rules, some of which work to improve
governance, and some of which work against good governance.11
Moreover, many sanctions are informal, rather than formal,12 such
that an elite who takes advantage of her immunity might still be
ostracized by fellow elites who think that her behavior reflects poorly
on them as a group. But the concept of informal institutions does not
capture all of culture, and does not fully explain the mechanism by
which individuals bring their culture to a new institutional
See Francesca Refsum Jensenius, Power, Performance and Bias:
Evaluating the Electoral Quotas for Scheduled Castes in India (2013) (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Berkeley) (on file with University of
California, Berkeley) (interviews with politicians and civil servants in Himachal
Pradesh, Delhi, and Uttar Pradesh in 2010 and 2011).
11
INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND DEMOCRACY: LESSONS FROM LATIN
AMERICA 11 (Gretchen Helmke & Steven Levitsky eds., 2006).
12
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE
LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973); Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, The
Deterrent Effect of Perceived Certainty and Severity of Punishment Revisited, 27
CRIMINOLOGY 721 (1989).
10
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environment, or how culture affects behavior, particularly where
host-environment and home-environment cultural norms conflict.
Social psychologists have long studied acculturation,
emphasizing that a mix of both the person and the situation predicts
behavior.13 Cultures condition the availability and accessibility of
different implicit theories that people use to interpret the social
world. The nature of the situation is comprised, in part, by whether
there is cultural consensus on what the situation is and what the right
course of action will be in a given situation.14 For example, cultures
might vary on interpersonal levels of agreement on whether a certain
behavior – like a political elite not paying a parking ticket – is
acceptable for a given person.15
2. Constraint Decay and Zero-Enforcement Environments
The data we use in this paper are from a study that examines
how diplomats in New York City who had enjoyed legal immunity
responded to a sudden legal crackdown on illegal parking.16 The part
of the data we focus on is the information about parking violations
among diplomats in the pre-crackdown zero-enforcement
environment. Some of these elites neither had de jure nor de facto
immunity in their home countries. For them, moving to New York
City therefore meant a change in the probability of being sanctioned
– providing immunity where none was enjoyed before. For other
elites, who enjoyed immunity in their home countries, there was little
change in their relationship to the law when entering a zeroenforcement environment – they remained above the law. The result
of the legal crackdown studied by Fisman and Miguel was clear:
enforcement worked. In this paper we are more interested in further

13
Walter Mischel, On the Interface of Cognition and Personality: Beyond the
Person–Situation Debate, 34 AM. PSYCHOL.OGIST 740 (1979).
14
Shane T. Mueller & Elizabeth S. Veinott, Cultural Mixture Modeling: A
Method for Identifying Cultural Consensus, 4 ARA TECH. REV. 39 (2008).
15
See generally Ying-yi Ho Hong & Desiree YeeLing Phua, In Search of
Culture’s Role in Influencing Individual Social Behaviour, 16 ASIAN J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 26
(2013) (providing a brief review of the literature).
16
Fisman & Miguel, supra note 1.
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exploring the variation in the behavior of the diplomats from
different legal cultures in the zero-enforcement environment.
A rational choice analysis of a zero-enforcement environment
would predict that, on average, elites would violate the law often, or
at least as often as the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs,
showing at least a partial convergence on a high-violation
equilibrium. A theory of cultural constraints would predict that elites
in a zero-enforcement environment would continue to follow the
norms to which they were accustomed.
But we might imagine that there is a “constraint decay” that
could happen over time, as those who initially are constrained by
culture enter a new environment in which the previously stigmatized
behavior is not stigmatized. This happens regularly in the noncriminal context, as people move from more conservative cultures
spheres to more liberal cultures spheres. It happens in the criminal
context, too, as people travel between jurisdictions that criminalize
certain behaviors (say, possession of marijuana, or consuming alcohol
below a certain age) and those that do not. And finally, it can happen
as elites gain or lose de facto legal immunity.
Our idea of “constraint decay” is similar in nature to what
Nagin refers to as “stigma erosion,” but it is on the opposite end of
the enforcement spectrum.17 Stigma erosion is the gradual decline in
the stigma associated with a behavior after an enforcement change
occurs and behavior becomes newly stigmatized. Here, we examine a
context in which the constraint comes from the culture or
institutions of a previous environment, and we explore whether those
constraints decay over time in a zero-enforcement environment.
There a several ways in which constraint decay could occur.
One is through personal experience, or what is increasingly discussed
as Bayesian updating.18 As a person acts with impunity in a way that
would constitute a violation under the prior regime, the prior
Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the TwentyFirst Century, 23 CRIME AND JUST. 1, 23 (1998).
18
See Shamena Anwar & Thomas A. Loughran, Testing a Bayesian
Learning Theory of Deterrence Among Serious Juvenile Offenders, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 667
(2011).
17
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constraint will slowly erode. In some conservative cultures, members
of the opposite sex are to avoid physical contact, including shaking
hands. In a culture in which no such constraint exists, people from
the conservative cultures might start to shake hands with members of
the opposite sex in order to facilitate other goals (such as business
opportunities or social integration), and the hesitation to offer one’s
hand will decrease with each new handshake that occurs without
social sanction. Or, in the wake of the legalization of possession of
small amounts of marijuana by the City of Denver, Colorado,
someone might smoke marijuana openly in their front yards and
experience no sanction from a nearby police officer. Each time that
happens, they learn that there really is no sanction for possessing and
consuming small amounts of marijuana in that jurisdiction.
Similarly, in an enforcement environment in which political
elites enjoy immunity from parking tickets, elites that are accustomed
to having to pay parking tickets in their home environment could
shed their hesitation from parking illegally over time, as their number
of unpaid parking tickets accumulated without sanction.
Another pathway by which constraint decay could occur is via
the observation of the experiences of others. With the handshake
example, people from conservative cultures would observe
handshakes between men and women without any social disapproval
shown. They do not have to actually take the “risk” of shaking hands
with someone of the opposite sex to learn that no social sanction
exists. Similarly, when it comes to elites, we can imagine them
changing their behavior solely based on the experiences of others
who have been in the new legal environment for a longer time.19

Constraint decay should happen faster for people who have fewer, or
less intense, ties to the home culture upon arrival in the new environment so that
the cultural norms of the home culture are not being consistently refreshed. For
example, a 20 year old college student from the United States (where the drinking
age is 21), who goes to Mexico on a church-related mission project with several
other members of the home church, is much less likely to drink alcohol while in
Mexico (where the drinking age is 18), than if she traveled to Mexico alone for a
study abroad program. The number and intensity of cultural ties among the elite
diplomats we study is impossible for us to observe with our data, so we leave this
hypothesis for others to test.
19
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Our notion of constraint decay can serve to reconcile the
predictions of rational choice theory and a theory of fixed cultural
constraints. If constraint decay drives behavior of elites in a zeroenforcement environment, then we should see a gradual increase in
violations among people from different rule-of-law-cultures over
time, but also a persistence in cultural differences. We might observe
it happen via the experience pathway, such that each ticket predicts
that the next ticket will happen with a shorter delay. And we might
simply observe it happen over time, regardless of the number of
tickets accumulated, which is consistent with the informal contacts
pathway.
III. DATA AND MEASUREMENT
The variation in the legal enforcement of unpaid parking
violations for diplomats in New York City provides an excellent
opportunity to explore what happens to elites from different rule-oflaw cultures in a zero-enforcement environment. Due to the legal
immunity of diplomatic personnel, the City of New York experienced
enormous amounts of illegal parking and unpaid parking tickets by
diplomats in the city. Illegal parking presented particular challenges
when the illegally parked diplomatic cars blocked fire hydrants and
access to handicapped parking spots, in addition to blocking traffic
by double-parking. The police would issue parking tickets every time
they found an illegally parked car from a diplomatic mission,20 but if
the mission did not voluntarily pay the ticket, the police had no
further way of sanctioning the parking violations, since diplomats
could not be taken to court for failing to pay the ticket. As of 2002,
UN diplomats owed the City $18 million because of the 150,000
unpaid parking tickets that they had accrued.21

20
As we explain below, the vast majority of diplomats had no unpaid
tickets over the time period, and we can assume, given the difficulties of parking in
New York City, that many did receive parking tickets over the same time period
and paid them. Hence, ticketing cars with diplomatic plates was a rational strategy
for the NYC parking enforcers.
21
Fisman & Miguel, supra note 1, at 1024.
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When it came to parking, diplomats from across the world
who came to New York City found themselves in a legal
environment where they were above the law. To limit the extensive
abuse of illegal parking, the City of New York enforced a legal
crackdown on diplomatic parking violations in October 2002. The
particular form of the enforcement was not to issue more tickets, but
instead to revoke diplomatic license plates on diplomatic cars that
had accumulated three or more parking violations that went unpaid
more than 100 days.
Using a dataset of month-wise unpaid parking violations for
diplomats in New York City, Fisman and Miguel showed a strong
correlation between the score on a commonly-used, unidimensional
country-level corruption index and the propensity for diplomats from
that country to park illegally in this zero-enforcement environment.22
They also analyzed individual-level data and demonstrated that the
number of unpaid violations per month increased with tenure in New
York City. While the emphasis in their article is on the impressive
effect of enforcement after 2002 – when the New York police started
towing cars that had an unpaid parking ticket – it is also an excellent
empirical example of what Durlauf and Nagin describe as a sudden
change in the certainty of punishment. The data are interesting because
they provide a unique insight into petty violations among elites from
across the world, rather than the more commonly studied college
students and non-elite criminals.23 Finally, it provides evidence of
what happens when individuals from various contexts encounter a
situation where it is common and fairly acceptable to commit an
infraction.

Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance
Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004 WORLD BANK POLICY RESEARCH,
(May 2005), http://go.worldbank.org/2GF3HGVDO0. (The “Kaufmann”
corruption index is one of the most common unidimensional ways to analyze
corruption. It is based on the work of Daniel Kaufmann and coauthors. Kaufmann
was Director of the World Bank Institute when the score was developed).Daniel
Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters IV: Governance
Indicators for 1996-2004 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper, May 2005),
http://go.worldbank.org/2GF3HGVDO0.
23
Durlauf & Nagin, supra note 3, at 16.
22
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In this paper, we use data from the pre-enforcement time
period to gain insight into what happens when political elites from
different cultures arrive in a zero-enforcement regime. The data
include the monthly number of parking violations for 1,995
diplomats present in New York for some or all of the time December
1997 until October 2002 – adding up to a total of 17,972 violations
or an average of about 1 violation per diplomat per month across
these years.
1. Rule-of-Law Cultures
Fisman and Miguel found that the overall corruption score of
a country was strongly correlated with unpaid parking violations, but
why was this the case? Why should the overall level of corruption in a
society result in diplomats feeling comfortable breaking the law while
abroad? Why should the habit of business elites in a country paying
their way to contracts, or bureaucrats extorting grease payments for
provision of simple services, or police extorting the citizenry, predict
these elites feeling comfortable parking illegally and not paying for
the parking ticket afterwards? We posit that it is not the level of
corruption in the country per se, but rather the rule-of-law culture and
the extent to which elites are used to (and comfortable with) being
above the law that predicts their behavior.
Measuring the cultural background of diplomats and their
perceived probability of being punished for a crime is not an easy
task. Corruption measures incorporate much more than the rule of
law, and rule of law measures incorporate much more than just the
“thin” concept of whether the government is subject to the law. A
growing literature calls into question the usefulness of existing
measures of the rule of law itself finding that they are both underand over-inclusive for measuring both “thick” and “thin” concepts of
the rule of law.24 General measures of the average rule of law in a

See generally THOMAS CAROTHERS, PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW
ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE (Thomas Carothers ed. 2006); Gillian K.
Hadfield & Barry R. Weingast, Microfoundations of the Rule of Law, 17 ANN. REV. POL.
SCI. 21 (2013); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Matthew D. McCubbins & Barry R. Weingast,
The Rule of Law Unplugged, 59 EMORY L.J. 1455 (2009); Melissa A. Thomas, What Do
24
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country do not capture the perceived probability of being punished
for the elite in a country. Our ideal measure might take into account
perceptions of whether the law governs the governors and whether
the judiciary is independent from other branches of government. It
would be less concerned with other aspects of existing measures, like
civil rights protection.25
To approximate the concept we are interested in, we turn to
an interesting effort to measure corruption that emphasizes the role
and importance of elites specifically. Michael Johnston proposed four
“Syndromes of Corruption,” or clusters of country corruption in
multidimensional space.26 His four clusters present an intuitive,
facially valid, description of elite subjection to the rule of law –
indeed, his conception of corruption, on which his clusters are based,
is “uses of and connections between wealth and power that
significantly weaken open, competitive participation and economic
and political institutions, or delay or prevent their development”, in
other words, elites’ uses of their elite status in ways that, even if not
illegal, undermine the country’s institutional frameworks.27
In creating the four syndromes, Johnston conducted a cluster
analysis on data for 97 countries. He used the Polity score to measure
the level of democracy in 1992 and 2002, the World Economic
Forum’s 2002 score for institutional and social capacity, the Heritage
Foundation’s 2002 measure of property rights, and the Economic
Freedom in the World ranking from the Fraser Institute from 1990

the Worldwide Governance Indicators Measure, 22 EUR. J. DEV. RES. 31 (2010); SvendErik Skaaning, Measuring the Rule of Law, 63 POL. RES. Q. 449 (2010).
25
In recent years the World Justice Projects has made great gains in
creating such a measure. However, these measures are not available for the time
period of the parking data we use.
26
MICHAEL JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES OF CORRUPTION: WEALTH,
POWER, AND DEMOCRACY, 3 (2005); See also Mark David Agrast, et al., Rule of Law
Index
2011,
WORLD
JUSTICE
PROJECT
2011,
http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/WJP_Rule_of_Law_Index_2011
_Report.pdf (A more recent measure which could be used to operationalize elite
law abidingness now exists: the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index, which
measures rule of law according to multiple dimensions, one of which is the
likelihood that elites are punished).
27
Johnston, supra note 27, at 12.
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and 2001.28 Democratic development and institutional and social
capacity would all tend to improve the rule of law, moreover,
impressions of elite legal compliance probably inform the measures
that are survey based. Using data from 1992 and 2002 allowed
Johnston to measure rates of change in these countries, as some of
the countries democratized and liberalized after their transitions from
communism and authoritarianism. Based on these data, Johnston
identified four groups of countries, which he described as Influence
Markets, Elite Cartels, Oligarchs and Clans, and Official Moguls.29
Importantly, the groups of countries cut across region, and one of
their most important distinctions is the status and power of elites in
each country.
Influence Markets (IMs) are eighteen countries that have a
generally high level of human development, are established
democracies, and have a strong rule of law. Leaders face competition
and are constrained from acting arbitrarily, economies are free, and
society is generally able to focus on quality of life, rather than
survival. These countries are called Influence Markets because the
rich generally have access to and influence on power, but the
institutionalization of the state does not allow corruption to violate
the established institutions. In Johnston’s words, “often politicians
serve as middlemen, putting their connections out for rent in
exchange for contributions both legal and otherwise.”30 Influence
markets include Japan, Austria, Uruguay, Finland, Germany, and
Costa Rica, among others. In terms of our discussion, elites’
perceived probability of being punished if caught in Influence
Markets countries probably does not vary much across individuals,
and is close to one for almost all people.
Elite Cartels (ECs), which include Argentina, Belgium,
Botswana, Greece, Israel, and South Korea, among others, are less
28
For more information about Johnston’s methodology, see his
description in Johnston, supra note 27. Our efforts to re-cluster his data by
systematically dropping one indicator at a time have resulted in poorer separation
between clusters.
29
See infra p. 33 Appendix A (providing a full list of the countries, the
rule-of-law cultures to which they pertain, and the distance from the statistical
center of the cluster identified by Johnston’s ANOVA).
30
Johnston, supra note 27, at 42.
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tightly clustered in Johnston’s data, but do share plenty of
commonalities. Namely, “the rules of the game” are less certain in
these twenty-one countries. Elites inside and outside of government
are less constrained by the rule of law, and “relatively established
elites collude within a moderately strong institutional framework.”31
The citizens of these countries are “relatively affluent,” and their
markets are relatively stable and open. However, institutionalization
of government is less well-developed or less-well controlled than in
the IM countries. Because of rapid industrialization or
democratization, elites in these countries find alliances across sector
lines and across the public/private sector divide. Black markets are
more prominent in Elite Cartels than in Influence Markets. In terms
of our discussion, we might expect the probability of being punished
to have a higher variance in ECs than in IMs but to still be fairly
close to one for most people. South Korea is a typical example: the
“rules of the game” are not as predictable as in IM countries, yet two
sons of two different South Korean presidents recently served time
in prison for corruption.32
Oligarchs and Clans (OCs) comprise thirty countries,
including Albania, Bangladesh, Colombia, Ghana, India, Nepal,
Turkey, Russia, and the Philippines. Oligarchs and Clans countries
have reformed politics and economics to a degree, but their
institutionalization has not caught up with their success in those
areas. Rule of law is uncertain in Oligarchs and Clans countries. As a
result of under-institutionalization, political elites will be “ill-equipped
to resist [. . .] abuses.”33 Political and civil rights are not always
guaranteed as a result. Security is low, which results in capital flight,
and political regimes are unstable. Regulation is “extensive and of
dubious quality”, and black markets are extensive.34 People are
generally poor in these countries, and primary exports are relied upon
heavily. In the case of our example, the perceived probabilities of
Id. at 45.
See Caroline Gluck, S. Korean President’s Son Jailed, BBC NEWS WORLD
EDITION (Nov. 1, 2002), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2384707.stm;
Nicholas D. Kristof, Seoul’s Mighty, Once Immune, Now Feel the Arm of the Law, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 14, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/10/14/world/seoul-smighty-once-immune-now-feel-the-arm-of-the-law.html.
33
Johnston, supra note 27, at 45.
34
Id. at 57.
31
32
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punishment for elites in OC countries will vary according to the
would-be offender’s connections to the Oligarchy or Clan that is in
power. Diplomats at the UN Headquarters are likely to be wellconnected to the elite and their home-country expectation of
punishment is therefore likely to be low.
The twenty-nine Official Mogul countries (OMs) are similar
to Oligarchs and Clans countries in that they are riddled with black
markets and poverty with ineffective governance and corruption
controls. However, in these countries, political elites are not
accountable to the people and are therefore effectively immune from
accountability. “[P]olitical power is personal, and is often used with
impunity.”35 Of all the groups, Official Mogul countries offer the
least protection of civil and political rights. They are also heavily
dependent on primary exports, and foreign aid that enters the
country can easily be skimmed off by elites. These countries include
countries like Chad, China, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Kuwait,
Morocco, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe. In terms of our model, it is clear
that the perceived probability of being punished for a crime for
members of the elite is close to zero. Elites from these countries are
therefore likely to be used to being above the law and feel quite
comfortable with this state of affairs.
When we divide the data for New York diplomats between
December 1997 and October 2002 according to the four rule-of-law
cultures, the data includes 516 diplomats from 17 IM countries, 427
diplomats from 21 EC countries, 566 diplomats from 29 OC
countries and 485 diplomats from 27 OM countries.36

Id. at 46.
Dividing the data into rule-of-law cultures reduces the amount of
information analyzed, because whereas the original parking tickets data included
151 countries, Johnston only has complete data on 95 of those countries. Most of
the countries that are omitted are small, but there are some exceptions such as
Israel and Saudi Arabia that we would like to be able to analyze but cannot for lack
of data. Overall, the patterns in the data do not change much in this reduced form.
Johnston’s sample has a mean corruption level of -0.19, which is slightly less
corrupt (around four percent less corrupt) than the parking ticket data’s mean of 0.009. This is a tiny difference in the data – it is 0.2 standard deviations on the
corruption indicator, and in the original dataset, there are only a few countries
between the original mean (-0.009) and the new mean (-0.19). In the Appendix we
35
36
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In the following sections we use these data to explore or ideas
about rule-of-law cultures and constraint decay.
Our first hypothesis is that because of the varying levels of
elite subjection to the rule of law among the four rule-of-law cultures,
on average, 𝑉!" < 𝑉!" < 𝑉!" < 𝑉!" , where 𝑉 is the mean number
of violations per diplomat per month, and the subscripts define the
group of countries. In other words, there should be a clear difference
in the behavior of diplomats from different cultures.
Our second hypothesis is about changes in diplomat behavior
over time. According to a Rational Choice perspective we should
expect to see that as diplomats’ time in New York increases, the
importance of the rule-of-law culture of origin rapidly disappear, such
that 𝑉!" = 𝑉!" = 𝑉!" = 𝑉!" . A culturalist explanation would, on
the other hand, would predict little change in behavior over time.
Based on our discussion we would rather expect to see cultural
differences persist (𝑉!" < 𝑉!" < 𝑉!" < 𝑉!" ) but weaken as the
diplomats’ home-country cultural constraints fade over time.
IV. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
In this section we will look at overall patterns, patterns over
time, and individual-level patterns in parking violations based on the
four rule-of-law cultures introduced in the previous section. We
begin our analysis by calculating the average number of parking
violations per diplomat per month, by group, as illustrated in Figure
1.
As is clear in Figure 1, there was considerable variation in the
average monthly number of violations across diplomats from
countries with different rule-of-law cultures for the period 1997–
2002. The differences in means between the four groups are reported
in Table 1. A series of two-sample permutation tests comparing the
differences in average monthly violations per diplomat between the
different groups of countries indicate that there are clear differences
in the behavior of diplomats from different cultures. In particular it
should the full list of countries in each group, how the groups related to the
Kaufman corruption score and also how it relates to Rule of Law measures.
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should be noted that the OC and OM countries (which have very
similar scores on corruption indices) differ significantly from each
other.37

Average violations per month per diplomat

Figure 1: Average number of parking violations per diplomat
per month, by group (1997-2002)
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EC
IM
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Date

We include in the appendix a box plot of both corruption indicators
and rule of law indicators by cluster. See Figures B.1 and C.1.
37
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Table 1: Mean violations per diplomat per month (19972002), by legal culture

IM
EC
OC
OM

Mean by Difference P-value
group
0.14
–
–
0.70
0.56
<0.01
1.06
0.36
<0.01
1.91
0.85
<0.01

Note: The comparison is between the group of countries on the
reporting line and the one listed above it. Data is individual-level
diplomat data on monthly violations aggregated to the country
group. P-values are from two-sample permutation tests with
10,000 permutations, using the perm.test() package in R.

But did all the diplomats start violating the law in this zeroenforcement environment? Table 2 shows the data for the diplomats
present in NYC between December 1997 and 2002. We present
diplomats’ average number of violations per month during the whole
time they were in the city. In this case the sample size given is for
diplomats, not diplomat-months.
We can see that among the diplomats from IM countries about
92% never accumulated unpaid parking tickets even once during their
stay in New York; about 7% let tickets go unpaid on average between
0 and 1 times per month and four diplomats had an average of more
than one unpaid violation per month.
Table 2: Percentages of diplomats with different average
numbers of violations per month
Average monthly
violations
0
(0,1]
(1,3]
(3,5]
>5

IM
(N=516)
92.4
6.8
0.8
0.0
0.0

EC
(N=427)
77.3
17.1
4.0
0.5
1.2
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OC
(N=566)
79.5
11.8
4.4
2.7
1.6

OM
(N=485)
61.2
21.6
11.6
2.7
2.9
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Interestingly, there is a major jump from the behavior of
diplomats from IM countries to EC countries. In the case of EC
countries, about 77% of the diplomats always paid their tickets, while
the rest failed to pay, at least occasionally. The trend we see is that
many of the diplomats from EC countries seemed to have adapted to
the new cultural environment by violating a bit, while few of them
were extreme violators. Among the diplomats from OC countries, on
the other hand, about 79.5% never violated, but there were a few
extreme violators that pulled up the average for the rest.
Looking finally at the diplomats from the OM countries, the
difference is striking: Among the diplomats from the OM countries
about 39% failed to pay parking tickets during their time in New
York City, and several of the diplomats failed to pay more than five
tickets every single month. Coming from a culture where they were
used to being above the law, and being placed in a zero-enforcement
environment, the diplomats from OM countries seem to have felt the
least compelled to follow parking regulations by paying their parking
tickets, or, put another way, the most willing to take advantage of
their immunity.
This provides empirical support in favor of our first hypothesis:
there is a clear rank-ordering in both the number of violations and
the number of diplomats choosing to violate.
We now turn to our hypotheses about convergence and cultural
constraints over time. In Figure 2 we look at the average monthly
number of violations for diplomats broken down by how long they
had been in New York. If diplomats behave purely rationally, then
we should observe them adapting quickly to the zero-enforcement
environment. Whatever their number of violations in the early days,
we should see a convergence at a relatively high level of violations
across groups. If diplomats behave purely according to their home
country cultures, we should see stable cultural differences in the
number of violations, which persist over time. However, if constraint
decay occurs, then we should see cultural differences at the outset,
with an upward creep in the number of violations over time.
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Figure 2: Average number of violations over time, by rule-of-law
culture
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As we show in Figure 2, cultural constraints appear to be present,
but they also seem to decay over time. Interestingly, few of the new
diplomats accumulated unpaid tickets during their first three months
in the city. As expected, the diplomats from OC and OM countries
were quicker to start taking advantage of the zero-enforcement
environment, increasing violations after only three months in New
York City. The diplomats from IM and EC countries seem to have
been more constrained by their cultures, although these constraints
gradually seemed to have weakened over time, with violations
accumulating after 6-12. 38 We view the gradual increase in unpaid
parking tickets in IM and EC countries as evidence of considerable
38
The separation is much clearer than if we run the simple quantiles of
the corruption index, implying that the typology of rule-of-law cultures gives more
explanatory power than the corruption score. Also, in this picture the difference in
the number of violations in OM and OC countries does not look as stark as in in
the previous table. The reason is that more of the diplomats from the OM
countries had stayed in NYC for more than one year. Their overall average was
therefore pulled up by all the frequent violators who had lived in the city for a long
time. We break down the length of diplomatic stay by rule-of-law culture in the
appendix. See Figure D.1.
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constraint decay: the cultural view that it is ethically wrong to take
advantage of one’s elite status dissipated when enough of others in
this new environment violated on a regular basis. At the same time,
Table 2 reminds us that less than 1% of all IM diplomats
accumulated more than one unpaid ticket per month on average.
Substantial cultural constraints remained.
Data on repeat violators helps to complete the picture. We
reduce the data to only the sub-sample of violators who left more
than one ticket unpaid during the time in New York. Among these
repeat violators, the average number of violations the first month they
violated at all was less than 1.5 for IM and EC diplomats. For OC and
OM diplomats it was 2.25 and 2.34, respectively, and these numbers
increased to 3.33 and 2.89 in the second month. Repeat violations
among diplomats from IM and EC countries held more or less steady
in their second month. Looking at how fast diplomats started to
violate, 20% of repeat violators from IM counties accumulated at
least one parking ticket during their first month in the city, a number
that was closer to 30% for the diplomats from EC, OC and OM
countries. On average, repeat violators received their first ticket after
they had spent about three months in the city, with the exception of
diplomats from OM countries, who got their first ticket after less
than two months in the city. Diplomats from IM countries were the
slowest to repeat violations, and diplomats from OC and OM
countries were the fastest. We summarize these results in Table 3.
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Table 3: Violation Behavior Among Repeat Violators

Percent of Diplomats
who were Repeat
Violators
Average Month of
First Violation
Average Number of
Violations, First
Month Violating
Average Number of
Violations, Second
Month Violating
Average Number of
Months between First
and Second Violation
Average Number of
Months between
Second and Third
Violations

IM
(N=34)
21.21

EC
(N=79)
29.11

OC
(N=88)
28.41

OM
(N=146)
30.82

3.03

3.38

3.5

1.80

1.15

1.49

2.25

2.34

1.14

1.57

3.33

2.89

8.10

5.81

4.27

3.49

5.15

3.32

2.41

2.81

Based on our theoretical discussion we believe that for OC and
OM diplomats, a home-country cultural background that views them
as largely above-the-law increased their readiness to “hit the ground
violating”, when compared to diplomats from IM, and to perhaps a
lesser degree, EC cultures.
The data we have presented in the previous sections reveal
several interesting patterns. First, we can to a large extent predict the
behavior of diplomats based on their rule-of-law culture. Diplomats
from OM and OC cultures were less likely to have entered New York
with any constraints on their immunity, and they were quick to start
violating the law. They also responded with frequent violations.
Second, even for diplomats from IM and EC countries, the
propensity to break the law increased over time, suggesting that their
cultural constrains decayed over time.
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Even so, it is important to note that most diplomats actually
complied with the law. Even in a zero-enforcement environment,
most diplomats paid their parking tickets, and among those who did
violate, most violated only once. In light of zero-enforcement and
constraint decay, a large proportion of diplomats seem to have seen it
as legitimate to violate occasionally, but not constantly.
Together these findings point to interesting interactions between
rule-of-law cultures and institutional constraints. Members of a
society might vary in their probability of sanction even if caught redhanded, and deterrence might function quite differently for elites
than for others.
V. CONCLUSION
Rule-of-law cultures and the social status of the actors
involved are both important and under-theorized considerations of
corruption deterrence. While deterrence is often thought of in terms
of the probability of detection and the size of the sanction, the
probability of punishment conditional on being caught is a missing
piece of the theory, and one that we hope to have illuminated in this
paper. This is particularly important in the case of elites, as there are
many groups and individuals across the world that may go
unpunished even in countries with otherwise well-functioning legal
systems.
When diplomats from across the world found themselves to be
effectively immune from punishment for parking illegally, diplomats
from some countries – namely those where elites are accustomed to
being able to evade punishment for criminal acts – took advantage of
the zero-enforcement environment. While existing theories of
deterrence would predict that all diplomats would abuse this rule to
the same extent, or that culture would dominate and levels of
violations would remain unchanged, we see instead that the
diplomats from countries in which elites tend to be more accountable
were more law-abiding. Some diplomats from strong rule-of-law
cultures also started violating in higher numbers over time, as their
cultural constraints decayed.
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Our study has focused on a rarified example – that of political
elites from all over the world living in a zero-enforcement
environment – but it joins other cross-cultural socioeconomic studies
that find cultural differences in economic behavior.39 Future research
on the mechanisms underlying the differences in behavior between
elites and non-elites would deepen our understanding about how
people behave in new institutional settings.

See, e.g., Joseph Henrich, et al., Economic Man in Cross-Cultural
Perspective: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies, 28 BEHAV. AND BRAIN
SCIENCES 795 (2005).
39
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A. APPENDIX: RULE-OF-LAW CULTURES
Table A.1: Influence Markets

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Influence Market (IM)
Distance from
Country name
Cluster Center
New Zealand
0.91
Germany
2.32
Switzerland
13.65
Netherlands
3.87
Sweden
8.76
Ireland
8.30
Austria
3.60
Australia
7.28
UK
1.29
Costa Rica
3.84
Denmark
3.65
Canada
2.78
USA*
3.86
Uruguay
9.90
France
9.24
Finland
8.24
Norway
7.66
Japan
2.92
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Table A.2: Elite Cartels

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Elite Cartel (EC)
Distance from
Country name
Cluster Center
Czech Rep
2.49
Slovak Rep
2.31
Greece
9.01
Chile
2.34
Paraguay
4.65
Panama
5.72
South Africa
5.52
Spain
7.39
Israel
6.88
Italy
2.98
Hungary
5.75
Namibia
4.57
Korea South
3.22
Portugal
2.63
Botswana
3.64
Belgium
9.07
Poland
3.75
Bolivia
8.03
Zambia
10.62
Brazil
5.54
Argentina
5.72
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Table A.3: Oligarchs & Clans

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Oligarchs & Clans (OC) Distance from
Country name
Cluster Center
Sri Lanka
9.49
Malaysia
7.20
Mexico
7.10
Malawi
2.48
Russia
12.69
Peru
11.62
Pakistan
14.73
Romania
4.25
Philippines
4.14
Nicaragua
2.86
Nepal
3.08
Senegal
7.90
Niger
9.07
El Salvador
2.31
Ecuador
3.99
Benin
1.64
Guatemala
3.63
Ghana
6.99
Turkey
3.24
Bangladesh
9.41
Albania
8.67
Colombia
4.81
Venezuela
8.28
India
3.72
Thailand
7.53
Madagascar
6.79
Jamaica
9.04
Trinidad & Tobago
8.89
Bulgaria
3.69
Honduras
2.99
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Table A.4: Official Moguls

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Official Mogul (OM)
Distance from
Country name
Cluster Center
Tunisia
2.36
Syria
12.33
Zimbabwe
8.38
Uganda
13.63
Togo
3.96
United Arab Emirates
7.44
Tanzania
5.66
Rwanda
2.94
Gabon
5.50
Egypt
5.58
Central Africa Republic
10.60
Indonesia
9.59
Haiti
2.54
Guinea-Bissau
7.93
Cameroon
2.82
Algeria
5.87
Congo Rep of
11.17
China
6.12
Morocco
7.79
Malawi
13.85
Kuwait
5.56
Oman
8.63
Nigeria
10.03
Ivory Coast
7.20
Iran
11.66
Chad
2.94
Myanmar
11.53
Jordan
13.77
Kenya
2.11
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B. COMPARING RULE-OF-LAW CULTURES AND THE CORRUPTION
INDEX

0

●
●

●

−1

●
●

●

−2

Corruption Measure

1

Figure B.1: Level of corruption among the countries belonging
to countries in each of the rule-of-law cultures
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How do the rule-of-law cultures relate to the Kaufman
corruption index used by Fisman and Miguel? Figure B.1 shows
corruption levels by rule-of-law culture. As can be seen in Figure B.1,
the Influence Markets’ mean level of corruption is much lower than
for the other groups, the mean level for the Elite Cartels is slightly
higher, while the Official Moguls and Oligarchs and Clans have a
similar and high level of corruption. While the Oligarchs and Clans
and Official Moguls have a fairly low variance on the corruption
index (0.12 and 0.29, respectively), Influence Markets and Elite
Cartels have a much higher variance of corruption levels, 0.44 and
0.51, respectively. Since the Official Moguls and Oligarchs and Clans
have similarly high levels of corruption, using only corruption as an
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indicator would predict a similar level of parking violations by
diplomats from the countries from these rule-of-law cultures.
However, as we observe in the analysis in the main text, diplomats
from the two groups of high-corruption countries behave differently,
lending credence to the idea that rule of law is not adequately
captured by corruption measures.
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C. RULE OF LAW INDEX AND RULE-OF-LAW CULTURES
We do not pursue a strategy involving a new rule of law typology
here because of the under-conceptualization and difficult
operationalization of rule of law over the time period. Specifically, we
lack quality data underlying the 2002 Rule of Law indicator measure
from the World Bank Institute, but even if it existed, is it largely built
on overlapping indices that do not separate nicely into clusters for
analysis. Instead, we show here that the rule-of-law cultures overlap
with the 2002 rule of law indicator in a very similar way as we saw in
Figure B.1, though the pattern is more muted.

0
−1

Rule of Law Measure

1

2

Figure C.1: Syndromes by Rule of Law Measure
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OM
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We believe that future scholars will be able to better approximate
rule of law measures – both “thick” and “thin” concepts. The World
Justice Project has already made great gains. Its data, unfortunately,
does not overlap with the time period under analysis here.
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